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This article attempts to get to the heart of some of the general misunderstanding and 
misapplication of Artificial Intelligence (AI) decision-making technology and proposes a regulatory 
model to place public rather than private interest at the heart of AI regulation. The article proceeds 
as follows. Section 1 introduces matters. Section 2 proposes a contextualized rather than a 
deterministic technology lens is needed to cut through the confusion and misunderstanding 
surrounding AI. Section 3 examines the nature of AI decision-making focusing on its human design 
and impact, and concludes that technology is not the root of problematic outcomes in the area but 
rather flawed human design and implementation. Section 4 examines the ownership and control of 
the major AI developers and concludes that a small group of humans with autocratic tendencies 
dominate AI development. Section 5 concludes that despite the unfortunate deregulatory instincts of 
the US and UK governments with regard to technology, AI should be treated in a similar manner to 
pharmaceutical products by introducing public interest regulation through the medium of a state 
regulatory body. Similarly a public interest technology regulator would address the autocratic 
ownership tendencies of the technology sector.  
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“The future is not google-able” 
 
William Gibson 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
Within the past decade Artificial Intelligence (AI) has passed from the realm of Science Fiction 
to apparent operational and legal reality, with even the European Parliament suggesting a form of 
legal personhood for AI.1 Within the academy AI conferences and networks abound as the potential 
for AI to deeply change our societies has become apparent. However, what is also apparent is that a 
complex science fiction veneer remains present in that many speakers and writers discuss AI 
impacts that exist only in novels as if they were real. Phrases like “machine learning”, “artificial 
neural networks” and “training the AI” are used casually and confusingly to imply sentience and 
superiority, when they merely refer to statistical models using mass computational power to make 
often deeply flawed decisions/predictions. Crucially, in general there is a wide spread 
misunderstanding of the limits of using AI statistical modeling to make decisions and its deeper 
societal and particularly legal implications. In general, AI is misleadingly portrayed and, 
worryingly, some academic work in the area is supported by the tech industry without many 
academics seeing, or declaring, a conflict of interest.2 Even when problems are recognized, the 
background radiation is that tech and AI are exceptional world changing positive forces determining 
                                                          
1 European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics (2015/2103(INL) 
2 This work is not funded by the tech industry. A. Orlowski, ‘Academics 'funded by Google' tend not to mention it in 
their work.’ Two-thirds of the time support is not disclosed, say campaigners, The Register, 13 Jul  2017 
<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/13/google_transparency_report_academics/>  
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our future for good. It is all somewhat reminiscent of the treatment of the tobacco industry in the 
1950s.3  
This article attempts to get to the heart of some of the general misunderstanding and 
misapplication of AI decision-making technology and proposes a regulatory model to place public 
rather than private interest at the heart of AI regulation. As such, the article proceeds as follows. 
The first section, here, introduces matters. The second proposes that a contextualized human rather 
than a deterministic technology lens is needed to cut through much of the confusion and 
misunderstanding surrounding AI. The third examines the nature of AI decision-making focusing 
on its human design and impact, and concludes that technology is not the root of problematic 
outcomes in the area but rather flawed human design and implementation. The fourth examines the 
ownership and control of the major AI developers and concludes that a small group of humans with 
autocratic tendencies dominate AI development. The fourth section concludes that despite the 
unfortunate deregulatory instincts of the US and UK governments with regard to technology, AI 
should be treated in a similar manner to pharmaceutical products by introducing public interest 
regulation through the medium of a state regulatory body. Similarly a public interest technology 
regulator would address the autocratic ownership tendencies of the technology sector. 
 
AI IN CONTEXT: SCIENCE FICTION V STATISTICAL MODELS 
 
In 2017, the European Parliament passed a resolution suggesting a form of legal personhood 
for Artificial Intelligence.4 In legal terms, this was an extraordinary idea given that legal personality 
is not lightly conferred in any jurisdiction.  Legal personality forms the gateway to a legal system 
and the rights and obligations that confers. Humans and important organizational forms such as 
companies and unions have historically claimed legal personality and, exceptionally, deities, rivers 
                                                          
3 S. Elliott. ‘When Doctors, and Even Santa, Endorsed Tobacco’ 
New York Times, 6 October, 2008.  
 <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/business/media/07adco.html> 
4 European Parliament, op. cit. n 1. 
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and certain higher level mammals have been granted legal personality, but not machines or 
computer programmes.5 That the European Parliament passed the resolution was even odder given 
that its own report in 2016 evaluating various problematic issues with AI and robotics concluded:  
In reality, advocates of the legal personality option have a fanciful vision of the 
robot, inspired by science-fiction novels and cinema. They view the robot — 
particularly if it is classified as smart and is humanoid — as a genuine thinking 
artificial creation, humanity’s alter ego. We believe it would be inappropriate and 
out-of-place not only to recognise the existence of an electronic person but to even 
create any such legal personality. Doing so risks not only assigning rights and 
obligations to what is just a tool, but also tearing down the boundaries between man 
and machine, blurring the lines between the living and the inert, the human and the 
inhuman.6 
 
Ultimately the European Commission preferred that 2016 view and did not include legal personality 
in its 2018 legislative plans.7  
There is much to draw from the conclusions of the 2016 report in terms of the central danger 
of AI. Despite the excited sci-fi inspired claims, AI is not human. It is a tool that can be used well or 
badly. In the end it is human decision-making as to its design and deployment that matters. 
Although AI is the subject of this article, the lens through which it is examined is human rather than 
technological agency. It is not always easy to focus on this, as human agency is easily disregarded 
in the high tech world, where human workers are often deliberately hidden behind technology 
platforms such as those used by Deliveroo,8 Google/Facebook,9 Amazon Mechanical Turk,10 or 
IBM’s AI Watson for Oncology.11 Recognizing that technology is not a preordained determinististic 
                                                          
5 E. O'Donnell, and J. Talbot-Jones. ‘Creating legal rights for rivers: lessons from Australia, New Zealand, and India.’ 
(2018) Ecology and Society 23(1):7.  
6  European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs study on European Civil Law Rules in Robotics, 2016 (PE 
571.379) page 15-16.   
7 European Commission  
‘Artificial intelligence: Commission outlines a European approach to boost investment and set ethical guidelines’ 
Brussels, 2018 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3362_en.htm>  
8 In this advertisement for Deliveroo the human delivery workers are literally invisible 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2f4u6HbH5xY> 
9 A. Singh, ‘Facebook moderators 'develop PTSD’  
The Telegraph, 31 May 2017 <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/31/facebookmoderators-develop-ptsd-
exposed-worst-content-internet/>  
10 https://www.mturk.com/ 
11 See discussion below. 
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force but a social construction produced by human decision making and comprehending who those 
human are, is key to maximizing the public benefit while minimizing the dangers of AI.12      
One of the first hurdles to asserting the human focus in the world of AI is the use of 
language that obscures the reality of AI. AI has two general industry/academic divisions – general 
or strong AI, meaning sentient human conscious type AI, and narrow or weak AI, meaning basic 
narrow/weak processes using statistical analysis of mass data sets and computational power. 
General AI is the ultimate science fiction inspired goal but does not exist.13  Weak/narrow AI is the 
reality. Some of the activity that narrow AI carries out mimics aspects of human intelligence such 
as speech or facial recognition. Some of its computational ability goes beyond human ability and 
the more complex statistical AI models can deal with some level of subtlety and nuance but is not of 
a human order of intelligence.14 A telescope is a complex precision tool designed to enhance human 
observational ability. It is not intelligent, but it has been intelligently designed by a human. A 
mechanical watch is a complex instrument that measures time but it does not consciously “decide” 
what time it is. Harrison’s H4 Marine Chronometer was the Sat-Nav of its day and was an 
extraordinary piece of human life-enhancing technology but no-one then or since has described the 
H4 as “intelligent” despite its extraordinary complexity.15 It remains a tool for human use designed 
by the immense intelligence of John Harrison. Neither the H4 or the telescope are intelligent in the 
human sense, just as a statistical model described and sold as AI is not intelligent.16 They are at best 
precision tools designed by humans for other humans to use. At worst, as will be explored, they can 
be error-strewn drivers of bias, inequality, death and loss of liberty.  
 So, what’s the problem with using a technically inaccurate phrase to describe this type of 
statistical computational automation? Misselling statistical tools as AI creates an illusion of and 
                                                          
12 T. Pinch, and W. Bijker. ‘The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the 
Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other,’ (1984)  Social Studies of Science 14 : 399-441. 
13 R. Yampolskiy, and J. Fox, ‘Artificial Intelligence and the Human Mental Model.’ in: The Singularity Hypothesis: a 
Scientific and Philosophical Assessment.’ A. Eden, J. Moor, J. Soraker, J. and E. Steinhart, (eds.) (2012) 129-145, 
Springer  
14 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (2009) Routledge, S. Russell, P. Norvig, (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern 
Approach, (2003) Prentice Hall, M. Ford, Architects of Intelligence, (2018) Packt, and B. Goertzel and C. Pennachin, 
Artificial General Intelligence, (2007) Springer. 
15 D. Sobel, Longitude, (1995) Penguin. 
16 M. Broussard,  Artificial Unintelligence, (2018) MIT Press, 1-39. 
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reaction to assumed superior intelligence, when in fact it is nothing of the order of human 
intelligence. Chess computers, AlphaGo and IBM Watson’s ability to beat humans within a narrow 
gaming skill set reinforces the illusion that computers are superior at decision making than humans. 
That same assumption would not be made about a telescope, even though, applying the tech AI 
personification logic, a telescope is better at looking at stars than a human is. In reality the telescope 
simply assists us make better observations and decisions.  
 The science fiction base for general AI, as alluded to in the 2016 report above, also fuels a 
dangerous anthropomorphic/personification loop for humans both for those who attempt to build AI 
statistical models and those end users who assume enhanced intelligence in AI decision making. It 
seems odd to have to articulate it, but science fiction is not real. The reality is that 199917 passed 
without a semi autonomous main computer supporting a human colony on the moon, 2000AD has 
come and gone without us discovering Verdus the robot planet,18 2001 passed and no HAL 900019 
emerged, while Blade Runner was set in 201920 and there are no androids so far this year. Similarly, 
although the Marvel Universe is confusingly multi-dimensional, Vision the android is currently not 
flying around this version of Earth.21 2029 has not yet come, so Skynet22 cannot be ruled out but so 
far in 2019 robots, like the Daleks, are not great at navigating stairs.  
 There is no doubt that science fiction can sometimes foreshadow and inspire real world 
technology by imagining what might be possible but it can also mislead in the AI context.  Our best 
AI decision making programmes are at heart statistical models with the usual human influenced 
problems of poor design, data and data interpretation that statistical analysis involves.23 The phrase 
“Lies, damned lies and statistics” variously attributed to Twain, Disraeli or Balfour has continual 
historical resonance because it recognizes that human judgment is at the heart of statistical integrity 
and not pure numerical truth. AI has been enormously oversold in terms of its capabilities, while 
                                                          
17 Space: 1999 was a popular UK science fiction TV series in the 1970s 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space:_1999#Other_media> 
18 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robo-Hunter> 
19 A. Clarke, 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), New American Library. 
20 Blade Runner June 25th 1982 <https://www.warnerbros.com/blade-runner> 
21 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vision_(Marvel_Comics) 
22 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Terminator> 
23 Broussard, op. cit. n. 16. Chapter 7. 
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companies also regularly misrepresent products as AI. In 2019, for example, two fifths of AI start 
up companies in Europe were found to use no recognizable AI technology in their products.24 That 
is not to say limited weak machine intelligence is not present or that an AI product doesn’t mimic or 
copy human intelligent behaviour –  Apple’s Siri and Amazon’s Alexa are designed to do just that. 
As Lipton, one of the worlds leading AI scientists, has described cutting edge AI:  
these are just statistical models, the same as those that Google uses to play board games or 
that your phone uses to make predictions about what word you’re saying in order to 
transcribe your messages. They are no more sentient than a bowl of noodles, or your shoes.25  
 
It is essential to understand this in designing regulatory safeguards for AI use because the humans 
designing, using or subject to the AI can similarly misunderstand the nature of the intelligence 
being observed and suffer as a consequence.  
For marketing purposes the tech industry often merges general and weak AI relying on a 
preexisting appetite for science fiction in film, TV and literature to excite the public. That use of si-
fi has an interesting duality: utopian visions of a leisure class served by intelligent robots 
simultaneously creates fear of dystopia, for most si-fi is dystopian, where the humans are 
enslaved.26 The utopian vision creates a futuristic positive desire for making the world better,27 
while the dystopian vision reinforces an existential threat, which in the tech industry narrative,  
technology and technology companies play a part in fighting. Apple’s famous Orwell inspired 1984 
Superbowl advert for example, has a heroic woman representing Apple fighting off a technological 
enabled Big Brother figure.28 In this tech centered world view we must trust the good heroic tech 
                                                          
24 A. Ram, ‘Europe’s AI start-ups often do not use AI, study finds,’ Financial Times, March 5 2019,  
<https://www.ft.com/content/21b19010-3e9f-11e9-b896-fe36ec32aece> 
25 K. Quach, “Facebook pulls plug on language-inventing chatbots?” The Register 
1 Aug 2017, 
<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/08/01/facebook_chatbots_did_not_invent_new_language/ > 
26 A. Jezard, ‘Technophobia is so last Century,’ Financial Times, March 2 2016, 
<https://www.ft.com/content/a9ec6360-cf80-11e5-92a1-c5e23ef99c77> 
27 F. Turner, ‘From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital 
Utopianism’ (2008).  
28 Apple’s 1984 Superbowl Advert can be viewed here <https://youtu.be/2zfqw8nhUwA> 
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products to protect us from the bad tech future. More recently AI’s ubiquity in general public debate 
allows additional mainstream association with film and media. For example Google Assistant 
advertising reworked the Home Alone film series in 2018 around a utopian motif where a grown up 
Kevin McCallister is never threatened by intruders, because Google Assistant’s control of the home 
keeps him safe.29 In February 2019, Microsoft AI sponsored The Hollywood Reporter’s entire 
coverage of the Oscars.30 Indeed, often within the industry and Academy, sci-fi forms the 
inspiration to try to create general AI and indeed the link goes both ways. Marvin Minsky, one of 
the key scientific figures in modern AI, both devoured and wrote science fiction, while also being a 
friend of Isaac Asimov and Arthur C. Clarke. He worked with Clarke and Kubrick on creating the 
vision of the menacing AI computer HAL 9000 that appears in 2001: A Space Odyssey.31  
The sci-fi element also has the effect of pushing back at law and regulation by the Orwellian 
Big Brother state because this would interfere with a utopian tech-immersive future. That sci-fi 
inspired tech future has been accompanied by a strong belief that new technology and its 
development is free of law and regulation by its very nature: that new technological frontiers are 
governed by mathematical calculation and old outdated preexisting laws cannot stand in the way. 
Technological determinism runs strongly through these claims.32 In 1996, the publication of “A 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” by John Perry Barlow captured what was to 
become the driving utopian determinist libertarian mindset of nascent internet tech companies – the 
root of the famous Facebook coder “Move fast and break things” tech philosophy.33 It begins: 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from 
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us 
alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. 
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no 
greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social 
space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. 
                                                          
29 Google’s Advert can be viewed here <https://youtu.be/xKYABI-dGEA> 
30 The Hollywood Reporter coverage can be viewed here <https://youtu.be/RFUFwJMweCo> 
31 Broussard, op. cit. n. 16. pp.71-72. 
32 B. Bimber, ‘Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism,’ (1990) 20 (2) Social Studies of Science.  
333–351. 
33 J. Taplin, Move Fast and Break Things: How Facebook, Google, and Amazon Cornered Culture and Undermined 
Democracy, (2017). 
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You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have 
true reason to fear.34 
In this tech utopia Uber is not a taxi company, Deliveroo is not a delivery company, Google and 
Facebook are not publishers/broadcasters/software or music companies and Tesla is not a car 
company. They are the utopian future and to restrict their activities through existing laws is to strike 
at freedom itself. As Vance notes, commenting on tech leaders’ futuristic world view, “They were 
all geeks raised on science fiction and the vision of space we had in the 1960s and 70s. Now they 
have the money to make this a reality.”35 US tech determinist libertarianism also has a particular 
business focused flavor.  Within the panoply of US libertarian political philosophy this comes 
closest to the autarchist libertarian school. As its inceptor Robert LeFevre described that distinction 
in 1965:  
If one believe in freedom, one must believe in economic freedom--full latitude of choice in 
any and all economic areas, for each person. This can never be accomplished by any 
procedure, organized or otherwise, which uses violence (even the violence implicit in 
taxation) to take from an owner anything which is rightfully his.36 
 
As such, the drive by tech billionaires such as Tesla’s Elon Musk and Amazon’s Jeff Benzos to 
explore space is not just seeking adventure. The ability to operate off-planet carries the autarchic 
libertarian promise of companies being able to operate in a genuine law free zone.37  
  This background radiation of determinist libertarian push back has an effect as governments, 
particularly the UK and US governments, are facilitating a deregulated libertarian tech-exceptional 
view, and industry self-regulation, as will be observed later, is accepted. In the AI context, pushing 
general AI as if it was real is extremely important to creating these regulatory pushbacks. Its most 
pervasive and dangerous application is in the narrow/weak AI terminology where “neural 
                                                          
34 J. Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, February 8 1996, 
<https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence> 
35 D. Tynan, ‘Rocket men: why tech’s biggest billionaires want their place in space,’ The Guardian, December 5 2016,  
<https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/dec/05/tech-billionaires-space-exploration-musk-bezos-branson>. 
36 R. LeFevre, ‘Autarchy vs Anarchy,’  Rampart Journal of Individualist Thought, (1965) Vol. 1, No. 4: 30–49, 49. 
37 C. Graham. ‘Factories in space: Amazon founder Jeff Bezos unveils vision for the future,’ The Telegraph, June 2 
2016,  
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/06/01/factories-in-space-amazon-founder-jeff-bezos-unveils-vision-
for/> 
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networks”, “machine learning”, and the phrase “artificial intelligence” itself, portray a general AI 
world of superior intelligence instead of the reality of extremely limited, mostly standard statistical 
models that are only novel in that they utilize the vast computational power increasingly available 
to us.  
Why does this matter? It matters for the regulatory push back as mentioned, but it matters 
also because to describe, say, Amazon’s now aborted AI hiring project as AI, or California’s 
criminal justice application COMPAS or Watson for Oncology as AI is to mislead those using the 
AI and those subject to its decision-making. The assumption is it is superior but as will be explored 
it is not. It can facilitate, as will be observed, unlawful hiring practices, racial and sexual 
discrimination, unnecessary financial hardship and, in the case of self driving cars or Watson for 
Oncology, place lives at risk. As Waters notes “Strip away the gee-whizz research that hogs many 
of the headlines (a computer that can beat humans at Go!) and the technology is at a rudimentary 
stage.”38 
Hiding that AI is simply comprised of statistical models can also hide that it’s not new or 
techy and so not logically part of our utopian deregulated tech safe harbours. Statistical models 
were first used in the 17th century and have a long and problematic history when used badly or 
when their predictive power is misunderstood.39 Unfortunately, the tech industry seems to have 
hidden its statistical models so well behind the AI façade that they have produced narrow/weak AI 
statistical and probability decision models that ignore three centuries of experience working with 
these models and their dangers. Poorly designed statistical and predictive models will fail; bias and 
dirty data is a big problem; and lawful human design, interpretation and continual audit of the 
results is essential. Additionally, software and hardware can be buggy and unreliable and the tech 
                                                          
38 R. Waters, ‘Everything still to play for with AI in its infancy,’ Financial Times, Feb 14 2019 
<https://www.ft.com/content/bf3d708c-3077-11e9-8744-e7016697f225>  
 
39 W. Willcox, ‘The Founder of Statistics’ Review of the International Statistical Institute (1938) 5(4): 321–328.  
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industry has a long and painful record of failing to evaluate the risks of its products and being 
delusional as to its capabilities.40 As Charette considered:  
software failures tend to resemble the worst conceivable airplane crash, where the pilot was 
inexperienced but exceedingly rash, flew into an ice storm in an untested aircraft, and 
worked for an airline that gave lip service to safety while cutting back on training and 
maintenance.41 
 
Doing it properly is a highly-skilled endeavor that is both expensive and time consuming. 
Mass computational power, while it allows greater statistical scale does not move the needle at all 
with regard to basic statistical integrity. Highly skilled human design, operation and oversight is 
still essential even if you’ve got access to a 93 petaflop computer. Facebook’s historical “Move fast 
and Break Things” philosophy is dangerous for users and those subject to its AI outcomes. 
Eventually, though, there are significant consequences for the company itself and its clients, when 
what they break is the law. 
     However, the statistical models currently called AI, used properly, recognizing their 
dangers, can be a useful tool for societal progress.  That is after all AI’s attraction. Freeing humans 
from dangerous or labour-intensive tasks, improving health and enhancing human ability to analyze 
the world is a positive goal.  A tool like a telescope allows humans to enhance their observational 
ability and ultimately send a probe outside the solar system, and a clock more accurately allows 
humans to gauge time, which in turn allows us to run a rail network. Well designed narrow AI can 
analyse huge data sets a human simply could not do and can produce counterintuitive data analysis 
outcomes that would be impossible for a human to discover on their own. Used badly, as will be 
observed, AI has the potential to send innocent people to jail, discriminate against women and 
minorities, unfairly exclude people from the financial system and public services, injure and kill 
road users and misdiagnose patients. Maximising the benefit while minimizing the dangers is the 
challenge.      
 
                                                          
40 R. Charette, ‘Why software fails,’ IEEE Spectrum, (2005) vol. 42, no. 9, pp. 42-49, Sept.  
 
41 Charette, id., p.7. 
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FINDING THE AI DECISION MAKERS. 
1.  
AI products abound, ranging from domestic appliances, such as smart dishwashers, to smart 
medical devices, AI phones and computers, smart speakers, AI human resources and AI quasi-
judicial decision making models. All are powered by versions of statistical/predictive models within 
the weak/narrow AI category. This section considers aspects of the design and operation of AI 
decision-making models focusing particularly on bias, the “black box” proposition, designed novel 
AI outcomes, complexity/superiority atrophy and low cost AI versus the humans. As before, the 
focus is on contextualizing the technology by drawing out the humans behind the AI and who are 
impacted by the AI.  
 As noted above, weak/narrow AI is not a new technological marvel but rather old 
mathematical statistical/probability models that have been calibrated and tested against known 
correct outcomes to make decisions based on those previous outcomes. The process for a basic high 
quality statistical machine-learning model should work as follows. First, a budget appropriate to the 
project needs to be set and reviewed as the project progresses. Getting this wrong can strongly 
undermine the quality of the AI outcomes. Second, detailed decisions need to be made by the 
designer to work out what the model will do. This first phase is key and should involve humans 
who have deep and detailed knowledge of the area that will be subject to the AI and the policy 
objectives to be achieved. Third, the designer decides what data will be used. This should involve 
an evaluation of the extent and quality of the data available. If the quality is too low then that should 
end the project until better data is available. High quality data is rarely available. In most cases, the 
data is not entirely complete or a bit problematic and some version of a median fill function is often 
used to plug gaps and complete the data set. This is normal but can affect the outcomes, as some of 
the data is by design incorrect. Fourth, standard statistical machine learning software would then be 
run, or in more complex situations involving image or language, something like an artificial neural 
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network.42 When the process of “training” or calibrating the AI against known decision outcomes 
reaches at least 90% accuracy, a working AI model exists. To do this properly on a commercial 
basis requires some very good data scientists and there are not many of those.43 Humans from a 
range of backgrounds also need to critically evaluate the outcomes and those outcomes should be 
lawful and explainable. Where elements of bespoke coding have been incorporated then the 
programme will likely need to be debugged, again… and again…44 When the AI goes live it will 
also need to be audited regularly to recalibrate it as it deals with new situations and to see if its is 
still performing along the policy lines set by the organization and the law. 
The steps described above do not often happen in commercial tech AI development as it is 
extremely expensive to produce a high quality AI model. In the US state of Idaho for example in 
2012 despite widespread knowledge of high level corrupt data and enormously problematic 
outcomes in testing, a statistical decision making algorithm was put into operation by public 
officials resulting in Medicaid cuts to 4000 disabled people. The widespread hardship this caused 
resulted in the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) bringing a successful court case to reinstate 
the payments.45 As the ACLU noted afterwards:  
the unfortunate part, as we learned in this case, is that it costs a lot of money to actually test 
these things and make sure they’re working right. It cost us probably $50,000, and I don’t 
think that a state Medicaid program is going to be motivated to spend the money that it takes 
to make sure these things are working right. Or even these private companies that are 
running credit predictions, housing predictions, recidivism predictions—unless the cost is 
internalized on them through litigation, and it’s understood that “hey, eventually 
somebody’s going to have the money to test this, so it better be working.”46 
 
It is very important to understand that at the heart of all this is human decision making, not artificial 
technological decision making. Humans set the budget, design the AI project, decide on the data, 
                                                          
42 Discussed below. 
43 M. Hamblen, ‘IBM and Google Create New Certifications for Data Scientist and Cloud Skills’, SdxCentral, January 
29 2019. 
<https://www.sdxcentral.com/articles/news/ibm-and-google-create-new-certifications-for-data-scientist-and-cloud-
skills/2019/01/> 
44 Broussard, op. cit. n. 16. Chapter 7.  
45 Toby Schultz v Richard Armstrong Case No.  3:12-CV-58-BLW  
46 J. Stanley,  ‘Pitfalls of Artificial Intelligence Decision Making,’ ACLU, June 2 2017. 
<https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/pitfalls-artificial-intelligence-decisionmaking-highlighted-idaho-aclu-
case>  
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write and debug the code, calibrate it against real human decisions, decide when to put it into 
operation and use it in the real world. These humans can be problematic. 
 
 
1. The problem of AI bias 
 
If those humans, particularly those designing the project, are not representative of society, 
have explicit and/or unconscious worldviews, this can strongly bias the outcomes. So who those 
human are matters a lot, and as Charts below demonstrate, they are mostly men particularly in the 
technical AI roles that matter and mostly white men.47 
 
 
Chart 1: Leading AI Tech Companies Gender Breakdown Worldwide 201748 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 White men predominate with the largest minority being Asian males. M. Garcia, ‘Racist in the Machine: The 
Disturbing Implications of Algorithmic Bias.’ World Policy Journal, (2016) vol. 33 no. 4, 111-117, 114. 
48 Reuters Data, 2018. 
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Chart 2: Leading AI Tech Companies Gender Breakdown Worldwide Technical Roles 201749 
 
 
 
 
For example, if the data for testing an AI model is chosen by men who have unconscious bias they 
may choose samples that are representative of their world experience but unrepresentative 
generally. This has happened already where systems have been calibrated/trained unthinkingly with 
dominant images of white men.50 Similarly with word-embedding AI techniques necessary for 
understanding written language or the spoken word, traditional gender roles have been attributed by 
the coders to women and men. In this attribution system women are homemakers and men are 
scientists.51 Predominantly white men are responsible for designing AI systems so the AI systems 
reflect those designers’ conscious and unconscious world view. At a practical level the AI systems 
can, as a result, have operational problems. Facial recognition systems are very good at recognizing 
white men but poor at recognizing black women.52 Google’s voice recognition system designed and 
                                                          
49 Reuters Data, 2018. 
50 J. Buolamwini, and T. Gebru, ‘Gender Shades.’ Proceedings of Machine Learning Research (2018) 81:1–15. 
51 T. Bolukbasi, K. Chang, J. Zou, V. Saligrama, and A. Kalai. ‘Man is to computer programmer as woman is to 
homemaker?’ in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (eds) D. Lee, M. Sugiyama, U. Luxburg, I. 
Guyon, and R. Garnett, (2016) 4349–4357. 
52 Buolamwini. Op. cit. n.49.  
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tested on men has significant problems recognizing women’s voices.53 Siri, Apple’s virtual 
assistant, initially refused to provide information on abortion services.54 California’s Criminal 
Justice COMPAS algorithm, used to assess risk of reoffending, was found to be racially biased.55 
Google’s facial recognition system was so poorly calibrated on non-white faces it misidentified 
black people as gorillas, while Microsoft’s Titter bot Tay quickly became a sex crazed racist when 
programmed to learn from other twitter users’ views.56   These outcomes are all the product of 
human bias, not determinist technological autonomy. 
AI hiring processes, for example, are emerging in the employment sphere and in those cases 
the calibrating “training” is based around specific definitive known data decision outcomes – those 
who were hired previously. CVs are analysed to see if they have the characteristics of those who 
were successfully hired in the past. In the training or calibrating process the AI program runs text 
analysis on past CVs to find a pattern that matches the known successful outcomes of those hired. If 
it gets a pattern that matches the known outcomes of those previously hired by humans to about 
90% accuracy an operational model exists that could work with the CVs of new applicants.  
In August 2018, Amazon abandoned its AI hiring program when it discovered that it was 
eliminating women from consideration. Based on 10 years previous hiring data the programme 
excluded women and sometimes hired unqualified workers. On investigation, Amazon was able to 
identify key aspects of the AI decision-making that led to those outcomes. The AI was “trained” as 
normal against a decade of CVs of successful candidates. The elements the AI favoured in reaching 
its decisions turned out to have significant flaws. Words in the CV indicating membership of 
“women’s” clubs or graduates from all women colleges eliminated or downgraded candidates and 
                                                          
53 R. Tatman, ‘Google’s speech recognition has a gender bias,’ Making Noise and Hearing Things,  
July 12 2016,  
https://makingnoiseandhearingthings.com/2016/07/12/googles-speech-recognition-has-a-gender-bias/ and H. Devlin 
and A. Hern, ‘Why are there so Few Women in tech,’ The Guardian, August 8 2016, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/aug/08/why-are-there-so-few-women-in-tech-the-truth-behind-the-
google-memo> 
54 D. Rushe, ‘Siri’s Abortion Bias Embarrasses Apple,’ The Guardian, December 1 2011, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/dec/01/siri-abortion-apple-unintenional-omissions> 
55 Broussard, op. cit. n. 16. pp 154-156 and A. Chouldechova, ‘Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias 
in Recidivism Prediction Instruments,’ (2017) Big  Data. Issue 2: 5 
56 C. Dougherty, ‘Google Photos Mistakenly Labels Black People ‘Gorillas’,’ The New York Times,  
July 1 2015, <https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/google-photos-mistakenly-labels-black-people-gorillas/> and 
Garcia, op. cit. n. 47, p. 112. 
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more subtle eliminations occurred by the AI favouring applicants who used male engineer type 
verbs such as “executed” or “captured”. In other words, the AI had found that the way to get a 90% 
accurate score in training on past data outcomes was to favour male characteristics and directly 
discriminate against women.57 In a tech industry dominated by men it had simply reflected and 
revealed the bias of past decision-makers to determine future outcomes.58  
 While this made headlines around the world, what perhaps should have made 
headlines was that this has been happening with employment based computer programmes since the 
1970s. The most famous example occurred at St George’s Medical School in London where a 
computer hiring programme excluded women and those with non-European names from 
consideration. The issue was the same as the Amazon AI example: the program had embedded the 
previous bias of past human decision makers, which had gone unnoticed by designers and users 
with similar world views. In 1987, an investigation by the Commission for Racial Equality found 
that the hospital had engaged in racial and sexual discrimination.59  Amazon abandoned its hiring 
AI system shortly after its problems came to light but other major companies such as Unilever and 
Microsoft’s LinkedIn use a similar system or are seeking to implement one.60 Other Amazon AI 
decision-making systems with similar problematic outcomes are in use in the public sector within 
the policing and quasi judicial systems of the UK and US, where the outcomes of their decisions 
have similarly shown bias; in particular racial bias.61 A bias-generating AI system, it seems, is 
unacceptable when operating within Amazon itself but exporting it to other organisations to inflict 
on the wider public is acceptable. In a broader sense control of AI development within the tech 
                                                          
57 AI is a fantastic tool for revealing bias. 
58 J. Dastin. Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool, Reuters, October 10 2018. 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-
showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G> 
59 S. Lowry and G. MacPherson, ‘A Blot on the Profession,’ (1988) The British Medical Journal, Vol 296, No. 6623, 
pp.657-8 and Garcia, op. cit. n. 47. 
60 R. Booth, ‘Concern as Unilever uses AI to do work of recruiters’ The Guardian, 25 October 2019 and J. Burn-
Murdoch, ‘The problem with algorithms: magnifying misbehaviour,’ The Guardian, 14 August 2013,  
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/aug/14/problem-with-algorithms-magnifying-misbehaviour> 
61 New Statesman/IBM, ‘AI in the public sector,’ (2018) New Statesman  
 <https://www.newstatesman.com/sites/default/files/ns_ibm_supplement_june_2018_1_.pdf >, J. Angwin, J. Larson, S. 
Mattu and L. Kirchner, ‘Machine Bias,’ ProPublica, 23 May 2016, <https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-
risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing>and M. Burgess, ‘UK police are using AI to inform custodial decisions,’ 
Wired, 1 March 2018, <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/police-ai-uk-durham-hart-checkpoint-algorithm-edit> 
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industry exports gender, racial and technical bias (see the discussion of the Black Box proposition 
below) outside the tech sphere to companies where those specific bias have not been present or at 
least not present to the extent they are within a narrow male science dominated tech industry. This 
tech bias contagion has the potential to do enormous harm.  
In a high quality AI model the outcomes should always have human oversight because, as 
discussed below, it is very difficult to tell a counterintuitive but possibly brilliant outcome from a 
dangerous error or an unlawful outcome. As Shah noted in 2017, “How to ensure that the algorithm 
is fair, how to make sure the algorithm is really interpretable and explainable - that’s still quite far 
off”.62 In short, most AI is not an intelligent technological agent but rather one designed, made and 
implemented by a particularly narrow group of humans. AI can have significant problematic design 
bias, is unable to entirely replicate previous human decision making, while simultaneously 
reflecting any bias in past human decisions. This is widely misunderstood even by the AI tech 
industry, as the Amazon example illustrates. 
 
2. Black Boxes and technical development bias 
 
However, not all AI is basic machine-learning based. Some tasks, such as image recognition 
and speech recognition/translation, contain nuance and subtleties that normal machine learning will 
not capture.  As such, more complex deep-learning AI models such as artificial neural networks 
have been developed to operate slightly differently, combining various machine-learning statistical 
algorithms into a framework originally designed to mimic how the neural networks in the human 
brain operate.63 So, from examples of tagged cat images, an artificial neural network can work with 
new untagged images and eventually identify with hopefully 90%-plus accuracy a cat or maybe 
                                                          
62 A. Theodorou, R. Wortham and J. Bryson, ‘Designing and implementing transparency for real time inspection of 
autonomous robots,’ (2017) Connection Science, 29:3, 230-241 
 
63 W. Sarle, ‘Neural networks and statistical models.’ (1994) Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual SAS Users Group 
International Conference, 1538–1550. 
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even a particular cat. However, their complexity can come with a significant flaw – explaining the 
basis for the program’s decisions can be difficult- this is the root of the black box proposition.64  
The black box proposition is that the decision making inside the AI system is so complex 
that it is not possible to know why a particular outcome arose. This does not occur because inside 
the AI black box is an inscrutable deep thinker, it is still a statistical model, but because the AI has 
been put into use when only half built: as it is missing a key diagnostic component that would 
explain the outcomes. For the same reason that bias has historically been a problem with AI and 
computer program’s generally, so too these systems have been deployed because a narrow group of  
human designers have not been concerned to know the basis of the decision, just that it works 
within certain technical parameters. In some situations, such as image analysis, where someone is 
searching for cat pictures on the internet, this technical development bias might be fine as 
explaining why a cat image was chosen won’t be important, but where explainability is important it 
is problematic.65  
These systems have been deployed because the designers have not been concerned about the 
basis of the AI's decision, but with its operational “beauty”, even if they have no idea how it works: 
a form of maths/engineering mindset bias.66 For computer scientists and engineers the key may be 
that the AI produces seemingly high percentage outcomes, but for lawyers, medical staff, citizens 
subject to its outcomes and ultimately for these systems to be lawful or useful in operation, the key 
is the basis upon which those operational decisions are made. Unfortunately, explainability has not 
until recently been part of the design remit. 67   
This lack of explainability also raises a significant legal red flag with the application of deep 
learning AI black box systems in the public sphere. Citizens can challenge state decisions based on 
flawed decision making or in any situation where recourse to the courts or appeal from the courts 
                                                          
64 P. Voosen, ‘How AI detectives are cracking open the black box of deep learning,’ Science, 6 July 2017, 
<https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/07/how-ai-detectives-are-cracking-open-black-box-deep-learning> 
65 J. Zerilli, A. Knott, J. Maclaurin, and C. Gavaghan, ‘Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making: Is 
There a Double Standard?’ (2018) Philos. Technol. 1-23 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-018-0330-6> 
66 S. Hossenfelder, Lost in Math: How Beauty Leads Physics Astray, (2018). 
67 Zerilli, op. cit. n.64.  
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depended on knowing the reasons for a decision.68 Similarly, as observed below, knowing the 
reason for a medical diagnosis or why a self-driving car crashed is crucial.  
In the health sphere, both Google and IBM have been developing AI health applications 
based around their general AI programmes. IBM’s Watson for Oncology offers a salutary lesson in 
the limits of the black box. As with Google’s AlphaGo game-playing AI, IBM developed Watson to 
play a popular US TV game called Jeopardy where the contestants are given the answer to a 
question and they must provide the question. Six years and enormous resources went into the 
project with Watson eventually triumphing over a Jeopardy grand master in 2011. Finding a 
business outlet for Watson’s very specific skill set proved challenging but eventually Watson for 
Oncology was the outcome. The only problem was, the skill set for Jeopardy was not easily 
transferable to cancer treatment. The solution was to have a range of outcomes provided by one 
hospital in the US for Watson to draw on. As Ross and Swetlitz found in 2017 in an investigation 
into the problems being reported about Watson for Oncology: 
“The system is essentially Memorial Sloan Kettering in a portable box. Its treatment 
recommendations are based entirely on the training provided by doctors, who determine 
what information Watson needs to devise its guidance as well as what those 
recommendations should be.”69 
 
In some ways IBM became a victim of the general AI misunderstanding and its own marketing 
claims that Watson would cure cancer, when really Watson is no different from other types of 
machine learning where tags such as “cat” or “not a cat” are used to identify images to train the AI 
on. In this case, it was doctors at one US hospital that did the tagging as to symptoms and treatment 
plans.  
In the context of medical care, Watson for Oncology revealed certain key problems. First, in 
a complex field such as cancer care a narrow data set of cancer diagnosis based in one hospital in a 
middle class US setting is unlikely to be easily scalable for treatment all over the world, where very 
                                                          
68 See for example Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] UKHL 9 
69 C. Ross and I. Swetlitz, ‘IBM Pitched its Watson Supercomputer as a revolution in cancer care.’ STAT, 5 September 
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different medical and nutritional circumstances are present.  Second, those using Watson found it 
difficult to understand why it was recommending a particular course of treatment, when it was 
counterintuitive or possibly wrong. Watson could provide literature to read that might be relevant 
but could not explain why it was relevant or the key reasons for the recommendation. The black box 
again proved problematic. Responding to this demand IBM now sells an AI product that it claims 
helps understand the Black Box outcomes of its other AI products.70  Things might have been 
different had IBM set out to design an AI application to cure cancer, rather than set out to design an 
AI to play Jeopardy.  
In March 2018, an autonomous Uber car crashed into and killed a woman wheeling a 
bicycle across a road during testing. Problems with the maintenance of the car and the failure of the 
human safety backup driver in the car combined with its AI decision making to cause the death.71 
Tesla similarly had a fatality linked to the failure of its Autopilot driving system in 2016. While the 
accidents dented public confidence in autonomous vehicles, the implications for AI more generally 
was that the investigators found it difficult to determine the decision making of the AI, particularly 
in the Tesla fatality.72 Decisions inside the AI black box were so complex it seemed, that they could 
never discover its role in the fatality.  
This marks a significant change to the regulatory challenge, where knowing what happened 
is essential for a range of regulators from road/air safety to medical and financial. The proposition 
from the manufacturers is that where AI is involved, it is an autonomous intelligent black box and 
not a statistical/probability model designed and implemented at too early a stage by the company. If 
the AI made the decision autonomously then the proposition also seems to be that it was not Uber, 
Tesla, IBM or Google’s fault. With this approach even weak AI would have to be accommodated in 
an autonomous legal liability process.73 Given the widespread misunderstanding about it, this is not 
                                                          
70 IBM Openscale <https://www.ibm.com/cloud/watson-openscale>. 
71 National Transportation Safety Board, (2018) Preliminary Report HWY18MH010, NTSB   
72 J. Stilgoe and A. Winfield, ‘Self-driving car companies should not be allowed to investigate their own crashes,’ The 
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an unrealistic scenario as tech companies already push the black box scenario. However, the point 
of this black box analysis here is not to pursue the legal implications of a possible mistake that has 
not happened yet but to inform debate so that the mistake is less likely to happen in the first place, 
as the only situation where the AI black box could be accepted as an autonomous decision maker is 
where the nature of weak AI and its poor human design is misunderstood. The autonomous black 
box is an illusion. A black box is a half finished, poorly designed, admittedly complex statistical 
model, that has been deployed too early in its development. As Stilgoe considered in response to the 
black box autonomy proposition of self driving cars:  
The terms ‘self-driving cars’, ‘autonomous vehicles’ and ‘driverless cars’ have been used 
almost interchangeably in public discourse... The differences in nuance implied by these 
terms should not distract us from a larger concern, which is with the rhetoric of autonomous 
technology. Technology, however, is never self-driving…Claims that technology has a will 
of its own… typically disguise a political agenda that is libertarian and deregulatory.74 
 
3. Private v Public Interest AI design 
 
Some AI designers, however, understand that because AI is a product of human design the 
potential exists for AI to shape the world to their own private ends in novel AI circumstances. This 
presents particular public interest regulatory concerns. Fears arose in the AI literature that in the 
trolley problem75 or lose/lose scenarios, the autonomous car AI would be programmed to save the 
car passengers over those outside it.76 Indeed, Mercedes executives appeared to confirm that 
Mercedes AI systems were programmed to save the driver and passengers over those outside the 
car.77 Important legal concerns arise here. AI does genuinely present novel possibilities for better 
decision making that lie outside the realm of human ability but only if the normative public interest 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
74 J. Stilgoe, J. ‘Machine learning, social learning and the governance of self-driving cars.’ (2018) Social Studies of 
Science, 48(1), 25–56 at 35. 
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Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 111, No. 5, pp.231-250. 
77 M. Taylor, ‘Self Driving Mercedes will prioritise occupant safety over pedestrians,’ Car and Driver, 7 October 2016 
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aspect of the human AI design decisions are recognized and implimented.  An autonomous car can 
make better decisions because its sensors and AI decision making can potentially react quicker than 
a human can. For example, if something appears suddenly in front of a human driver their reaction 
is to break suddenly or swerve to avoid the object. The reaction will be the same whether the object 
is a plastic bag or a human. In each case, the driver chooses to place themselves, the passengers and 
potentially other road users at risk over an unknown external object because the human cannot 
determine what the object is in time to make the best decision. In the plastic bag example, breaking 
or swerving is not likely to be the best choice. The AI can potentially make a better choice if 
programmed to place the lives of those in the car and other road users in priority to the bag. 
However, in the trolley test situation where it is a choice between saving the driver and passengers 
or someone stepping onto the street in front of the car, choices are already being made by the AI 
industry to favour the driver and the passengers. After all, the industry logic goes, they paid for the 
product. 78  
Similarly, Facebook’s AI algorithms are deliberately used to shape people’s perception of 
events and can facilitate discriminatory behavior.79 China’s development of AI is primarily driven 
by its recognition of AI’s design potential to achieve authoritarian ends. Designed bias was exposed 
in the financial sector when in 2010 the bank Capital One used its understanding of algorithmic bias 
to deliberately channel ethnic minority customers to higher interest credit cards.80 Online retailers, 
including Amazon, use or have used differential pricing based on algorithm bias.81  In 2010 and 
2015 flash crashes in the financial markets were blamed on algorithmic trading. This was correct 
but what was little understood was that these were not rogue trading algorithms; these were 
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algorithms that were deliberately designed by traders to manipulate the market and cause the 
crash.82 Novel “designed” AI decision making such as this, have important public interest 
regulatory implications. It should not be left to the AI designers to decide financial market prices, 
interest rates, the price of goods, who to vote for, or who lives and dies.  
 
4. Complexity Impacts 
 
As has been observed AI can have problematic embedded bias, is not quite as good as 
humans at decision making, its outcomes can lack transparency and can be designed to work against 
the public interest. An additional exacerbating factor that drives potential AI harm is the general 
misunderstanding that AI has superior intelligence to humans and therefore that the human user and 
humans subject to the AI defer to its outcomes even when an outcome is manifestly problematic. In 
the medical profession there is a long and painful history of deference to computer outcomes in 
complex diagnosis situations such as radiology dosages, where experienced professionals have 
simply accepted clearly mistaken dosages produced by a computer. As a New York Times 
investigation found in 2010 in the context of computerized radiology dosages: 
while this new technology allows doctors to more accurately attack tumors and 
reduce certain mistakes, its complexity has created new avenues for error — through 
software flaws, faulty programming, poor safety procedures or inadequate staffing 
and training. [H]ospitals… are often too trusting of the new computer systems and 
software, relying on them as if they had been tested over time, when in fact they 
have not.83  
The assumed superior ability of the computer to make the right decision even when the decision 
was manifestly incorrect impacted here even where experts were involved.  
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In 2018 and 2019 two crashes within a few months of each other involving Boeing’s new 
737 Max 8 quasi-autonomous fly-by-wire system have thrown up issues of complexity atrophy and 
AI complexity.  Pilots cushioned by years of fly-by-wire autonomous flying may have been unable 
to deal with suddenly having to fly a plane in difficult circumstance where that plane has been 
aerodynamically designed to be primarily piloted or assisted by AI or may have been fighting to 
correct a fly-by-wire decision made by the computer system but not understood by the pilot.84 These 
combinations may also have greater impact where AI is being used by non-experts such as in an 
employment or public sector situation. Richard Eppink, the legal director of the ACLU Idaho who 
has been at the forefront of litigation challenging problematic AI decision making in the public 
sector considered: 
My hunch is that this kind of thing is happening a lot across the United States and across the 
world as people move to these computerized systems. Nobody understands them, they think 
that somebody else does—but in the end we trust them. Even the people in charge of these 
programs have this trust that these things are working.85 
 
 In the AI context, complexity/superiority atrophy is compounded by potential bias, the limits of AI 
decision-making versus humans and the black box problem, making it difficult for users to tell the 
difference between a counterintuitive and potentially life saving AI outcome and a mistake. 
 
 
 
5. Understanding the bargain  
 
 Even the highest quality AI decision-making models present challenges for the user and 
those subject to its decision-making. As already considered, AI decision-making is not 100% 
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accurate relative to the human decisions it has been trained against. A really high quality system 
might get to 97% but many systems are in use at lower accuracy rates. 90% plus accuracy in the 
calibrating/training process is also not what it seems. As noted before, most large AI data sets are 
incomplete and have been statistically enhanced to complete them so their accuracy may well be 
below 90% in application, as some of the data is incorect. Poorly designed software and bugs in the 
software and problems with hardware can also affect AI accuracy. Indeed, large scale human facial 
recognition AI systems deployed by the Metropolitan police and South Wales Police have been 
revealed to have accuracy rates of only 2% and 10% respectively, generating thousands of false 
positive criminal identifications of innocent citizens.86 Uncertain environments that do not conform 
to the training environment can also be problematic. For example currency trading AI used to trade 
UK currency has been suspended as the unpredictability of fluctuations due to Brexit made it 
useless as it was trained on historical data.87 An ahistorical event is impossible to train for. 
Similarly, AI judicial decision making models become unreliable as new variables appear that 
depart from the training data.88 In essence when the future is not like the past AI struggles and if not 
recognized it locks in a future based on the past.   
All this is acceptable and still useful if decisions relate to whether an image is a dog or a cat 
or predictive text outcomes but 90% accuracy is much less acceptable in other context. In a judicial 
criminal process as an example, where ostensibly no innocent person should go to jail, then a high 
quality 97% accurate AI decision system implemented in a judicial context would move to 3 in a 
hundred innocent citizens, or higher if from a minority group, going to jail who would not have if 
humans made the decisions. That same system will have much lower accuracy as new variables are 
encountered that depart from its training data. As mentioned previously, certain types of black box 
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AI would present additional insurmountable challenges in both the criminal context and in judicial 
review, as the reason for the decision would remain unknown. In 2019 Partnership on AI produced 
a report stimulated by the widespread use and planned mandatory use of AI decision making in the 
US judicial criminal system. In recommending that such systems should not be used to solely 
determine questions of individual liberty it stated: 
[u]sing risk assessment tools to make fair decisions about human liberty would require 
solving deep ethical, technical, and statistical challenges, including ensuring that the tools 
are designed and built to mitigate bias at both the model and data layers, and that proper 
protocols are in place to promote transparency and accountability. The tools currently 
available and under consideration for widespread use suffer from several of these 
failures…89 
 
In the medical context similar failures might similarly mean 3 in 100 dying who would not 
have otherwise died, or more if they did not match the training dataset. In the employment context a 
90% accurate system would mean 10 in 100 not hired who would have been hired in a human 
decision making process. Those 10 will likely be statistical outliers who do not fit the norm for the 
organization, most likely women, ethnic minorities or those with different educational qualifications 
or backgrounds. Potential organizational innovators would be excluded to the detriment of the 
organisation.  
Despite the limits of AI decision-making, the potential for bias, the black box issues, the 
private v public interest clash and the potential for complexity/superiority atrophy, a huge driver of 
AI decision-making development for the public sector, private sector companies and their clients is 
cost. Cost savings for AI over human decision-making are enormous.90 Unilever estimates a saving 
of 100,000 person hours or aprox £800,000 using its HR AI system instead of interviewing and 
assessing candidates using humans.91  Weighed against the long term diversity and innovation of 
the organization in terms of candidate sex, race ethnicity and educational background, the balance is 
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likely to fall in favour of cost saving.  Indeed, even where diversity and innovation is valued by an 
organization, the AI exclusion of diverse innovators may not be recognized or quantifiable in the 
cost evaluation of AI implementation. While the flaws are problematic and potentially unlawful 
they are also complex to understand and shrouded in an exciting sci-fi utopian veneer. If it is good 
enough and the cost savings are huge then it will get implemented flaws and all.  
While in the Mercedes (passengers over pedestrians) and Capital One (charge minorities 
more) examples the companies recognized the normative possibilities of coding the AI to achieve 
an outcome that favoured their private interests over the general public, amazingly, Amazon with all 
its resources in AI development seemingly gave no thought to the basic statistical problem of data 
bias or that the AI outcomes in an employment context had to be legal. The narrowness of technical 
design focus, utopian assumptions that the tech is good or the notion that this is a new unregulated 
frontier has left a troubling absence of basic normative legal design planning at the heart of AI 
decision-making systems and allows the possibility of both designing against the public interest or 
freezing historical bias forever, locking out and locking up minorities and outliers from 
participation in society.  
In 2019, MMC Ventures produced a report on the state of AI and identified the potential for 
AI to facilitate illegal practices and discrimination in housing, employment, education, social 
welfare, insurance, finance, differential pricing, liberty, privacy and dignity as well as undermining 
democratic institutions.92 That is quite a list. The possibility of AI as both a designed and an 
unthinking driver of inequality is of huge concern. That regulatory space needs to be filled rapidly 
as poorly designed and potentially strongly narrow private interest serving AI is increasingly rolled 
out across the public and private sectors, while remembering that it is not the tech that is our central 
problem but the flawed humans behind its implementation. The mechanism for tackling this will be 
returned to in the conclusion. The next section considers the unusual human governance behind the 
tech AI companies, as this forms another important part in understanding the dysfunctional human’s 
shaping the AI field.   
                                                          
92 MMC, op. cit. n.91 Chapter 8. 
 29 
 
AI GOVERNANCE: THE MEN AND ONE WOMAN BEHIND THE GOVERNANCE OF AI 
 
While there are problematic humans on the technical side of designing and implementing 
AI, if the human contextual lens is set wider, it also reveals problematic humans behind the façade 
of the AI companies. Five years ago, the major global AI players were UK and US companies, with 
the UK’s DeepMind probably the most advanced AI developer in the world. Since then, the leading 
UK companies have been bought by the US ones, including DeepMind, which is now owned by 
Google, and the Chinese government has become a significant force in AI development.93 Although 
the UK AI developers are still based in the UK they are now owned and controlled from the US.  
The global balance of leading AI development has split between the US and China.94 While China 
is considered later when discussing dysfunctional public governance, this part considers the private 
sector governance of the leading private sector AI developers, Uber, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, 
Google, Apple, IBM and Tesla. As will be observed, they almost all have unusual private sector 
governance structures designed in general to give control to a small group of insiders with tight 
connections to each other and very similar backgrounds and interests. Governance in these leading 
AI companies is in general unusually autocratic and unaccountable even in the context of weak 
private sector accountability. The section proceeds by examining each company and its key 
ownership and control features.  
Uber was until very recently a private company subject to little public accountability. In 
May 2019 it became a public listed company. It has two key controllers.  The first is Travis 
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Kalanick, who resigned as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in 2017 because of accusations of 
perpetuating a culture of sexual harassment and fraud litigation brought by a major shareholder. 
Kalanick also famously developed and implemented a programme called Greyball to evade law 
enforcement investigations into Uber’s activities globally.95 The fraud litigation was eventually 
settled by a broad restructuring of the ownership and control of Uber, whereby Kalanick’s power 
and shareholding was reduced through a major investment by Softbank. Kalanick remains a 
significant shareholder but is no longer a lone controlling shareholder: he sits on the board and has 
the right to appoint three board members. As a result, Softbank is now the major shareholder in 
Uber and has the right to appoint two board members. 96  Together, Softbank and Kalanick hold 
22% of Uber’s shares. Softbank is a Japanese listed company owned and controlled by Masayosi 
Son through direct control of 25.5% of its shares. Son is also the president, chairman and CEO of 
the company.97 Son is as a result the second significant controller of Uber. Softbank’s investment in 
Uber is part of an explicit attempt to shape the direction of AI to Son’s personal futuristic agenda 
through Softbank’s $100 billion vision fund.  He has been described both as “crazy’ (he once 
threatened to set him self on fire in a clash with regulators) and as the most powerful person in 
Silicon Valley.98 Softbank lists his centrality and unpredictability as one of its key business risks.99  
The other leading AI companies have been listed for decades so all are now subject to a 
range of enhanced private sector accountability norms. While criminal and specific market-oriented 
regulation designed to protect the public operate in the background, overseen by the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), it is important to understand that private sector governance does 
not aim at any sort of high level accountability process beyond legal duties focused on fidelity and 
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competence and certain historically problematic issues such as executive accountability to 
shareholders. UK and US board legal duties, while nodding at stakeholder governance, are 
ultimately primarily focused on shareholders’ interests and are generally weak.100 Additionally, the 
corporate governance codes101 to which these listed companies adhere aim to underline certain high 
risk historical agency cost issues such as having an audit, remuneration and appointment committee, 
not combining the CEO and chair role (dangerous but acceptable in some codes), having 
independent non-executive directors, pay disclosure and shareholder engagement. The aim overall 
is to ensure that the executive directors are subject to robust monitoring on behalf of the 
shareholders. There are three problems with this when applied to these AI tech companies: The 
legal duties are weak and don’t contain any public interest element, standards differ significantly 
depending on the corporate governance code used and in any case code compliance is optional. Non 
compliance has no particular consequence other than perhaps shareholder discontent. Third, and 
probably most significantly, in the tech sector the key board members and executives are generally 
the shareholders.  
There are a number of organisations that monitor governance standards of companies 
worldwide. Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is one of the most significant and compiles a 
governance risk score for listed companies based on private sector governance compliance norms. 
A score of 1 is a low risk company in governance terms and a score of 10 is very high risk. Apple 
and Microsoft have overall scores of 1, IBM and Amazon have scores of 7 and Facebook, Alphabet 
(Google’s parent company) and Tesla have scores of 10.102  Apple, and Microsoft aside, private 
sector governance compliance is generally very poor in the tech companies, even within the context 
of a weak private sector set of accountability norms. However, the majority of these companies are 
also outliers within listed companies in terms of their ownership and control, which in many ways 
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subverts even the weak private sector accountability processes focused on compliance in terms of 
accountability to shareholders. As with Uber, when key insiders are also significant shareholders 
then the accountability numbers become meaningless and the high number governance scores more 
alarming. Even low numbers can hide an accountability gap. Apple for example has a score of 1 but 
some of its key executives and board members are its largest individual shareholders.103 Microsoft 
has largely migrated away from a founder led and controlled company but still has some significant 
insider holdings and Bill Gates, its remaining founder, still sits on the Board.104 IBM is different 
from the other leading AI tech companies in that it is led by a woman, Virginia M. (Ginni) Rometty. 
However, as is the norm in the tech sector it also has poor governance and executive accountability 
generally, as its ISS score indicates, because among other things Rometty simultaneously holds all 
the key accountability roles on the board as the CEO, president and chair and she and other 
executives are the largest individual shareholders in the company.105 Amazon similarly has poor 
governance practices and is founder-controlled both executively and through Jeff Benzos’s 16.1% 
shareholding, which allows him to hold the chair, president and CEO roles, which waves a big red 
flag in corporate governance accountability terms as it provides one individual with a dangerous 
concentration of power and removes any internal board accountability.  In 2014 Benzo’s famously 
controlling leadership106 was rewarded with the International Trade Union Congress “worst boss” 
award. In conferring the award the Congress noted:  
Amazon operating in Germany treats its workers as if they are robots. The company makes 
no secret that within just a few years they will replace workers with robots. A rich American 
corporation operating globally with disdain for dignity, for rights for working people. Jeff 
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Bezos represents the inhumanity of employers who are promoting the American corporate 
model.107  
Tesla, Facebook and Alphabet have extraordinarily poor governance practices and are founder-
controlled through shareholdings or manipulation of shareholder voting rights. Elon Musk holds 
nearly a third of the shares in Tesla and until recently was its chair and CEO.108 Although Tesla 
does not have any dual class voting rights that might give Musk additional voting control, from 
Tesla’s historical SEC filings it is clear that it has supermajority voting clauses in its corporate 
constitution on issues such as ownership change and board participation, which effectively mean 
Musk’s votes have important blocking rights.109 His brother, Kimbal Musk, is also a shareholder 
and sits on the Tesla board even though he has no experience in the industry.110 Over the course of 
2018 and 2019, Elon Musk’s lack of accountability and open contempt for US securities law and 
the SEC, led to a fraud action and settlement with the SEC, whereby the board of Tesla was 
reformed and Musk gave up his chair role. He also agreed to restrictions on his potentially market-
manipulating public statements. He remains as CEO and controlling shareholder. In February 2019, 
he was alleged to have breached the SEC settlement by tweeting an uncleared misleading claim, 
after which Tesla’s general legal council resigned. The SEC subsequently pursued a contempt 
charge against Musk.111 In all, in 2018, over 40 Tesla executives resigned including its general legal 
council and his subsequent replacement (after two months), as well as the company’s chief financial 
officer.112  
Facebook is owned and controlled by Mark Zuckerberg through a dual voting structure that 
gives him direct control over 53.3% of the voting rights and an additional agreement with the 
second largest shareholder that allows him to control the voting rights of that shareholder as well. 
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He is the controlling shareholder, chair and CEO.113 This size of voting control, executive position 
and board role, gives Zuckerburg control over every accountability mechanism in the company and 
removes any form of private sector accountability. The extent of Zuckerberg’s control is highly 
unusual even within companies with dual class rights. In 2012, on Facebook’s listing on the 
NASDAQ stock exchange, ISS described the structure as “an autocratic model of governance”.114 
In a decision of dubious legality in 2017, Zuckerberg sought to sell some of his shares but retain 
voting control in a move that was ended only after shareholder litigation ensued.115 The autocrat tag 
proved prescient in the Cambridge Analytica scandal (Facebook users private data was harvested 
and used for political purposes without their consent) that engulfed Facebook and Zuckerburg in 
2018, and which followed on from an earlier little-noticed similar scandal in 2009.116 What became 
clear in the investigations that followed was that Facebook, despite its scale, influence and power, 
was a one person company. Zuckerberg’s autocratic tendencies have been well documented.117 
Indeed, he even recognises his vast power himself.118 
Google is similarly structured through a dual-class voting structure. Alphabet is the listed 
parent company of Google, the posterchild for tech avoidance of private sector accountability.   
Google was the first Tech company to list in 2004 with dual class shares designed to ensure founder 
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control on listing. Up until that point such structures only existed in family media companies such 
as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal and was justified on the basis of protecting 
editorial independence. Such structures were rare until 2004 and considered generally unsuitable 
and dangerous for shareholders, as they have been shown to exacerbate accountability problems and 
encourage value-destroying decision making.119 Google justified the dual-share structure as 
protecting against takeovers and to allow focus on the long term, while making clear that Google 
was in reality comprised of its founders, and an investment in the company was an investment in 
them.120 On listing, Larry Page and Sergey Brin controlled over 50% of the company’s voting 
rights.121 Page is now also the CEO and Brin the President of Alphabet.122  
In 2014, having sold off enough shares to put their 50% majority control in danger they 
issued new C class shares with no votes so that they and other executives could continue to cash in 
their shares without losing control.123 The dubious legality of doing this and potential litigation, that 
is, acting in their own interest instead of in the interests of the company, was avoided by the 
company underwriting any shareholder losses (estimated to be $500 million) caused by the new 
class structure.124  As discussed above, attempts by Zuckerberg to do the same as the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal unfolded, failed. As with Facebook, Google has similarly continually been 
involved in controversy globally about data gathering and misuse, while more recently its 
employees have walked out in protest at its engagement with autocratic governments,125 military 
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use AI126 and its handling of sexual discrimination and harassment claims.127 In 2018, one of 
Google’s senior AI researchers resigned because of Google’s breach of its own AI principles in 
assisting the Chinese government to develop project Dragonfly, a censorship and data gathering 
tool. In a letter to the US Senate Commerce Committee asking for more oversight of Google’s 
activities he stated: 
Dragonfly is part of a broad pattern of unaccountable decision making across the tech 
industry. It has been made clear, both by word and by action, that the leadership at Google 
will be clamping down on the types of internal investigation that were necessary to bring 
Project Dragonfly to light.128  
  
In 2018 Google removed its “Don’t be Evil” motto as an ethical imperative at the centre of its code 
of conduct.129  
To put those tech founder shareholding percentages in context, a big stake for our largest 
global institutional investors (pension insurance and investment funds) in a public listed company 
would be ownership of 7-8% of its shares. Aggressive hedge fund investors such as Elliot 
Management would buy such a 7-8% stake if they wanted to get board seats and influence a 
company’s strategic direction.130 In other words, a stake of that magnitude provides significant 
input into the control of a company. Benzos’s 16.1% shareholding, while small by comparison to 
Zuckerberg and the others, is by normal standards a huge chunk of voting rights and gives him de 
facto control of the board. Similarly Son’s 25.5% shareholding in Softbank confers de facto control. 
Softbank and Kalanick’s 22% combined share of Uber, as well as their control of five board seats 
gives them similar levels of de facto control. A stake approaching 30% such as Elon Musks gives 
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him, along with his constitutional blocking rights, both de facto and legal control over who are the 
members of the board of Tesla and with it total strategic control of the company. The voting rights 
of Zuckerberg, Brin and Page are extraordinary and well beyond the voting control necessary to de 
facto control the board of their companies. In both Facebook and Google (Alphabet) they have both 
de facto and total legal control of all the organs of the company. The dubious attempts, successful in 
Google’s case, to maintain more than 50% voting control (the trigger for full de jure voting control), 
while taking the economic benefits from sale of their shares, exhibits a bizarre level of unnecessary 
controlling paranoia and greed. In short, our AI tech leadership are particularly autocratic and 
dysfunctional.   
Another significant governance factor is how interlinked the tech owners and the key AI 
companies are. Apart from Softbank, they are US Companies. Apart from IBM and Softbank they 
are located in Silicon Valley and Seattle. Musk and Klanick are connected to each other as they 
were co-founders of another company, Paypal. Page is a shareholder in Tesla and a close friend of 
Musk.131 Zuckerberg and Kalanick are also friends.132 A major tech investor, Peter Thiel, also links 
Amazon, Facebook, Tesla, Uber and Softbank. Thiel was the most significant early funder of 
Facebook and remains on its board. Thiel has shared business ventures with Softbank133 and Jeff 
Benzos134 and links Zuckerberg, Musk and Kalanick as he was also a Paypal founder. Son and 
Apple are linked through Apple’s investment in Son’s Vision fund and through Softbank’s 
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ownership of ARM, the chip designer for iphones.135 Facebook and IBM have a marketing 
partnership.136 IBM also has a crucial infrastructure partnership with Amazon.137 Gates the founder 
and board member of Microsoft, and Benzos are business partners, Seattle neighbours and 
friends.138 Microsoft became a major investor in Facebook in 2007 and the two companies also have 
joint advertising and infrastructure partnerships.139 Google part owns Uber.140 Benzos was also an 
early investor in Google and owns nearly 4% of Uber.141 More explicitly, Microsoft, IBM, Amazon, 
Facebook and Google have an AI partnership aimed at shaping industry technical standards and 
public perception of AI Technology.142 To an extent, geography seems to play a key part in those 
connections, with Silicon Valley having one group of connections and the Seattle pair another with 
Rometty alone in New York, but that said, clear business interest overlaps exist.  
Here again, there is a specific group of humans behind the tech companies, shaping the 
agenda. All apart from Rometty are male. All apart from Son and Rometty are white males and all 
including Son were educated in the US and almost all operate autocratic governance models in their 
companies. They have little accountability unless they break criminal laws. Billionaire tech 
                                                          
135 A. Massoudi, J. Fontanella-Khan and R. Waters (2016) SoftBank to acquire UK’s Arm Holdings for £24.3bn, The 
Financial Times, 18 July,  https://www.ft.com/content/235b1af4-4c7f-11e6-8172-e39ecd3b86fc and R. Mickle and L. 
Hoffman (2017) Apple Confirms $1 Billion Investment in SoftBank Vision Fund, The Wall Street Journal, 5 January, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-confirms-1-billion-investment-in-softbank-vision-fund-1483552846 accessed 17 
March 2019. 
136 S. Lohr (2015) IBM and Facebook in Marketing Partnership, 6 May, 
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/ibm-and-facebook-in-marketing-partnership/ accessed 17 March 2019. 
137 https://mainframedebate.com/2018/07/26/amazon-and-ibm-announce-linuxone-server-partnership/ 
138Mainframedabate (2018) Amazon and IBM Announce LinuxONE Server Partnership, Mainframedebate, 26 July, S. 
Best (2016) Bill Gates teams up with Richard Branson and Jeff Bezos to lead a $1 BILLION venture to tackle climate 
change, The Daily Mail, 12 December,  https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4025044/Bill-Gates-teams-
Richard-Branson-Jeff-Bezos-lead-1-BILLION-venture-tackle-climate-change.html and R. Williams (2017) The weirdly 
intertwined lives of Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos, inews, 28th July, https://inews.co.uk/news/technology/the-weirdly-
intertwined-lives-of-bill-gates-and-jeff-bezos/ accessed 17 March 2019. 
139 B. Stone (2007) Microsoft to Pay $240 Million for Stake in Facebook, The New York Times, 25 October, 
 https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/technology/24cnd-facebook.html  and D. Bach (2017)  Microsoft, Facebook and 
Telxius complete the highest-capacity subsea cable to cross the Atlantic, Microsoft, 21 September, 
https://news.microsoft.com/features/microsoft-facebook-telxius-complete-highest-capacity-subsea-cable-cross-atlantic/ 
accessed 17 March 2019. 
140 Bullock, N. and  Bradshaw, T (2019) Uber seeks $91.5bn valuation in this year’s largest IPO, Financial Times, April 
26th  https://on.ft.com/2W5xwa4 accessed 29 April 2019. 
141 B. Stone. (2013) The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon, Random House and French, S. (2018) 
All the companies in Jeff Bezos’s empire, in one (large) chart, Marketwatch Jan 30,  
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/its-not-just-amazon-and-whole-foods-heres-jeff-bezos-enormous-empire-in-one-
chart-2017-06-21 accessed 17 March 2019. 
142A. Hern (2016)  'Partnership on AI' formed by Google, Facebook, Amazon, IBM and Microsoft, The Guardian,  
 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/28/google-facebook-amazon-ibm-microsoft-partnership-on-ai-tech-
firms accessed 17 March 2019. 
 39 
autocrats who live, work and hang out together in small geographic locations brings with it an 
obvious and urgent concern of disproportionate influence and unrepresentative group think.  
That would be the case even if the tech community did not have a particularly US 
determinist autarchist libertarian143 deregulatory world view, as noted earlier. Thiel, for example, is 
the arch libertarian of the tech community and a supporter of President Donald Trump.144 Similarly 
Musk and Klanick share those libertarian leanings and both accepted short-lived advisory roles in 
Trump’s administration.145 Son has similarly promoted Trump and his deregulatory agenda.146 Tim 
Cook and Rometty both currently sit on Trump’s Business Advisory Board.147 Zuckerberg seems to 
share or at least value Thiel’s views.148 Page regularly laments government interference in Google’s 
attempts to create a techno libertarian utopia.149  Benzos has funded the Reason Foundation, a 
libertarian thinktank.150 Tech billionaires generally also appear to have a very specific admiration of 
Ayn Rand’s individualist libertarian work.151    
  That utopian techno autarchist libertarianism also matters beyond the important 
technological power of these tech leaders to shape agendas through their companies or through their 
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group think. As already noted, reflecting a tech deterministic libertarian ethos, tech companies have 
an unusual relationship with the law. A key element of that is the emergence of the internet, which 
has allowed traditional and new businesses to deliver their products and services in radically new 
ways and to shelter behind the tech libertarian utopian view that this is all new and therefore 
existing law does not apply. That is the point of the Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace 
in 1996 considered in Section 2. Tesla insists it is not a normal car company subject to normal 
safety considerations.152 Facebook, Apple and Google are not publishers or broadcasters so a range 
of laws to protect children or pay artists should not apply.153 Amazon and Tesla push the concept of 
employer to the limit in terms of working conditions.154 Uber claims it is not a taxi company subject 
to employment law or taxi regulation.155 As further discussed in Section 5, the UK and US 
governments have, until recently, been deregulating the sector and allowing it to self-regulate. 
While these companies can work together to shape technical AI standards and public 
perception of AI, they also engage in significant lobbying to shape or remove the law. Indeed, while 
all have significant lobbying engagement with government, overall Google is the second most 
active company across all industry sectors lobbying EU institutions, with Microsoft number eight, 
Facebook number twelve and IBM number sixteen.156  In the US, Google, Amazon, Facebook, 
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Apple and Microsoft were five of the biggest spenders on lobbying in 2018 with Google, as Table 1 
illustrates, significantly outspending its peers.157  
 
Table 1. Leading US Technology Company Lobbying Expenditure 2016-18158  
 
 
As well as core technology issues, the tech companies’ lobbying also focused on tax law reform, 
which has become a feature of their autarchic activities globally, not just in terms of using 
aggressive multi-jurisdictional corporate law strategies to reduce tax paid, but also to fight changes 
to the law that might impact on tax or change the law to reduce their taxation.159 The EU estimated 
in 2017 that international tech businesses paid less than half the tax of traditional companies.160 
This small group of companies dominate global private sector AI development.161 Their 
products are not neutral or benign but are developed by mostly white male AI technical staff with 
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world views that can consciously or unconsciously exclude, kill, lock up and impoverish millions of 
humans given their global technological reach. Their technical staff work for mostly white male 
autocrats with similar educational backgrounds and world view, ideally seeking an autarchist 
libertarian utopia free from law and taxation. This is not a group that will provide a solution to AI 
dysfunctionality and urgent public interest considerations. Indeed, as this article has argued, a 
contextualised understanding of this technology is necessary to see that these dysfunctional humans 
are the reason for the existence of dysfunctional AI and that AI is not a superior deterministic 
technological force. A solution will not lie with the industry itself.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In many ways, the biggest challenge lies not in identifying the problematic issues with AI 
but rather the state of the public governance response. When it comes to technological change, 
governments have historically been wary. Famously, Elizabeth the First turned down a grant of a 
patent for a knitting machine to William Lee, remarking:   
Thou aimest high, Master Lee. Consider thou what the invention could do to my poor 
subjects. It would assuredly bring to them ruin by depriving them of employment, thus 
making them beggars.162  
 
The Hapsburg, Francis the First, banned railways for fear of its potential to fuel threatening social 
change. Indeed, so deep was this fear that when he did allow a railway to be built the train had to be 
pulled by horses and its lines were deliberately irregular so that it could never be used by a steam 
engine. Tzar Nicholas the First banned cotton mills and iron foundries and the Sultans of the 
Ottoman Empire banned printing.163 More recently, China at first similarly feared and resisted 
technological change because of its potential to trigger social change. But as it became clear that the 
state could use technology to Xi Jinping’s authoritarian ends, China has become a major player in 
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technology generally and AI particularly.164 The lesson from China’s AI engagement for 
democracies is that AI in the wrong hands can be very dangerous. Unfortunately, until recently, the 
UK and US governments have not engaged in shaping or controlling AI for the democratic public 
good, instead leaving it to be shaped and controlled by a small group of tech companies, in their 
own interests.  
The moment has come to recognise AI as a problematic social construction produced by 
human decisions in the tech industry and to regulate in the public not private interest.  However, in 
both the UK and US, governance dysfunction abounds as deregulation and self-regulation have 
formed key parts of nationalist AI strategies. For the past few years, as part of a post-Brexit 
nationalist tech-friendly strategy, the UK has been quietly deregulating to facilitate AI 
development.165 The under secretary of state Claire Perry stated in 2015, “I believe we have one of 
the most welcoming regulatory environments for development of this technology anywhere in the 
world.”166 The UK has specifically allowed tech companies to take the lead on its independent post-
Brexit Industrial Digitisation Strategy. Published in 2017, and led by the CEO of Siemens, this 
strategy advocates speeding up and increasing the adoption of automation and AI and warns:   
other countries are stealing a march on the UK. There are coherent government strategies in 
place in most developed countries, for example in Germany (Industrie 4.0), China (Made in 
China 2025), and the USA (America Makes). So, the UK needs to act quickly if it is to 
harness the potential of this agenda.167 
 
A second UK AI-specific report co-authored by Jérôme Pesenti, Vice President of Artificial 
Intelligence at Facebook, continues the urgent-boosterish competitive theme.168 There is little 
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concern in either report for the issues raised in this article. As a result, the UK is now the centre of 
Europe’s deregulated AI startup boom.169  
In the US, a similar welcoming legislative approach has been taken to tech companies since 
the advent of the commercial internet. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
was introduced to protect the nascent US internet companies by giving them broad legal immunity 
for content posted on their sites. The overall effect has been more problematic than originally 
foreseen in disadvantaging traditional publishing, facilitating extreme content and removing legal 
and moral responsibility for content from powerful no longer nascent US companies such as 
Facebook and Google.170 More recently, President Trump has, within the technology sector, through 
a combination of his appointees to the Federal Communications Commission and executive 
orders,171 pursued a very successful deregulatory agenda ending net neutrality and generally 
allowing industry self-regulation.172  
However, the Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal and its connection to Russian 
interference in the 2016 US Presidential election, as well as general privacy and monopoly concerns 
have begun changing the public interest response.173 Across the EU, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) is in place to deal with the tech companies’ misuse of 
information and the European Commission has produced ethical guidelines for AI as well as putting 
in place a policy framework to encourage investment in “trustworthy” AI.174 In 2017 the UK 
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Government set up the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation to advise on data and AI regulatory 
issues.175 The report of the UK Digital Competition Expert Panel in March 2019 recommended a 
regulatory unit to examine the anti-competitive behaviour of the large tech companies.176  
Individual states have begun introducing digital tech company taxes, while a global tech tax 
compact is back on the agenda.177 In the US, individual states such as California have passed 
privacy laws aimed at protecting people from tech company misuse.178 The US Congress has begun 
oversight hearings on the behaviour of the tech companies with regard to data misuse, while the US 
Department of Justice is investigating the big tech companies on a wide range of issues from data 
privacy to anti-competitive behaviour.179 Breaking up the big US tech companies has also become a 
campaign issue in the Democrat party presidential primary elections.180 
The moment has also come to specifically regulate AI. As has been argued here, AI creates 
significant private versus public interest flashpoints. Solutions that are in the public interest and that 
are human focused are possible. Treating the tech industry as the pharmaceutical industry is treated 
would be one way to solve certain key issues. In such a regulatory model, AI products would be 
submitted for testing and licencing to an agency (say, the “Artificial Intelligence Licencing 
Agency” (AILA)) in a model that would be a mix of the UK National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence and the UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, requiring a mixture of 
technical, ethical, legal and economic expertise. In overall terms, the aim of AILA would be to 
address the flashpoints identified within this article. First, ensuring the public interest is served in 
situations of genuinely novel AI decision-making rather than solely the private interest of the 
developer or their client. Second, ensuring the law is inserted within the AI design phase at an early 
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stage and is evaluated throughout. Third, ensuring that high levels of statistical integrity are 
maintained within the design process. Four, AILA would ensure bias abating design and testing was 
implemented throughout the AI development process, ensuring that those designing and/or 
externally evaluating the AI were a diverse group in terms of background, gender and skills. Five, 
the sphere within which the AI was being deployed would be considered. High risk sectors such as 
criminal, employment, medical and the public sector generally might be inappropriate/unlawful for 
AI applications, except in exception circumstances. In evaluating black box AI, AILA would work 
within a general principle that if it is not explainable, it is not deployable. Exceptions would be 
allowed where there was a significant public interest in its deployment such as medical scanning. 
Six, the agency would also develop public interest AI policy and recommendations on dealing with 
complexity/superiority atrophy situations where there might be significant public harm.  
Within the scope of this article, the possibility of large scale displacement of human 
employees by combinations of AI and automation, as it moves into cognative employment roles, 
has not been considered.181 However, AILA could also consider the social and employment 
displacement effect of the AI implementation and cost the licence accordingly. Where there was no 
displacement effect the lowest cost licence would be given. Where there was a high risk of human 
displacement due to its implementation (and that could be extraterritorial displacement as well) the 
costing would be set around or above the 15% cost saving threshold that is estimated to trigger mass 
automation.182 The cost equation would then move back to employing humans. In the most extreme 
displacement situations such as replacing workers in a low skill, high unemployment area the 
licence could be refused.  
Our current version of UK and US financial capitalism does not deal well with urgent public 
interest issues such as AI when the dominant economic and legal paradigm focuses almost 
                                                          
181 D. Autor, ‘Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation.’ (2015) 29 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3-30.  
182 P. Davidson, ‘More robots coming to U.S. factories,’ USA Today, 10 February 2015,  
<https://eu.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/02/09/bcg-report-on-factory-robots/23143259/>  
 47 
exclusively on shareholder’ private interests.183 And while a critique of the totality of financial 
market capitalism is beyond this work184 we can observe that tech autocratic ownership is uniquely 
antagonistic to both stakeholder and efficient market hypotheses conceptions of the corporations. Its 
justification rests solely on arguments that it is necessary to support innovation. However, while 
evidence exists to show this has some effect, it quickly dissipates and becomes negative.185 
Remarkably autocratic tech ownership serves neither stakeholder communities or efficiency 
justifications but rather the interests of tech owners and the finance industry: a sort of techno-
financial coup has occurred. Allowing tech founder-companies to list as dual class entities has 
allowed a small unrepresentative group access to vast public market funding, which in turn has 
allowed them to wield disproportionate power over the shape of technology and in turn our 
democracies. Dealing with it requires creating a public interest technology regulator (PITR): 
placing a public interest requirement within board fiduciary obligations; removing dual class rights 
and other enhanced voting mechanisms from tech companies; providing PITR with rights to sit on 
the board, a veto over tech listings, continued listing and board personnel; nationalising and/or 
breaking them up, as Senator Elizabeth Warren has suggested, would move us towards a solution to 
that techno-financial coup.186  
In the determinist autarchic libertarian technological context, law is subject to a fair amount 
of false news. Regulation is treated with horror and law as an enabling force is rarely mentioned. 
However, law that prohibits discrimination is enabling of minorities and women. Quite apart from 
the moral dimension of inclusion and fairness, without their participation in society creativity and 
economic progress is stifled. Employment law protects the economically vulnerable from the 
economically powerful. The ability to challenge in court the decisions of the state and those in 
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positions of private power, forms a key part of the state’s democratic legitimacy and the power of 
the citizen. Privacy laws protect key aspects of human dignity upon which human freedom and 
creativity is based. Progressive taxation is wealth redistributing. Laws and regulatory actions based 
on principles of democratic sovereignty, justice and fairness are not negative aspects of our society. 
Technology is not by its nature placed outside that lawful sphere and those who implement 
technological tools in a democracy, that have or can cause public harm, are subject to public interest 
regulation. These are not negative actions of the state but rather a positive protective force for 
creative, inclusive, human development in the public interest, not the narrow private interests of the 
very, very few.  
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